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How does a leader deal with a workforce 
that is increasingly transient and for 
which organizational loyalty is no longer 
a hallmark of professionalism? How are 
questions involving public relations, 
legality, and political involvement and 
interest handled? These problems are 
not unique to the military� There is no 
discussion of how leaders cope with pe-
riods of disruption, challenge, or failure�
Two other issues deserve mention� The 
first is the book’s method of citation: 
there are no footnotes or traditional end-
notes� This aids the casual reader but not 
the serious scholar, student, or executive 
who needs to delve deeper� Perhaps the 
publisher insisted on this methodology; 
if so, one hopes it is for the last time�
The other issue is more challenging� 
McChrystal goes to significant lengths 
to present Team of Teams as a collabora-
tive effort� This is commendable, and 
there may be portions of the book that 
represent a collective effort that is so 
interwoven it defies any assignment of 
individual credit� However, McChrystal 
is the only author who truly can explain 
the senior leader’s perspective and feel-
ings� As such, his voice should dominate 
the work, or at least be given clearly 
identified and dedicated portions of the 
book to provide solely his point of view�
Despite these shortcomings, Team 
of Teams belongs on any bookshelf 
devoted to modern works on leadership� 
It asks important questions, has more 
than a few sensible recommenda-
tions, and provokes useful follow-on 
conversations� Its readability also will 
be a plus for business school students, 
who increasingly will be likely to find 
it on their list of required texts�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Gear Up, Mishaps Down: The Evolution of Naval 
Aviation Safety, 1950–2000, by Robert Dunn� 
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017� 224 
pages� $29�95�
The average American’s view of 
naval aviation likely is informed by 
the movie Top Gun or, for those with 
some historical knowledge, the carrier 
battles of World War II in the Pacific� 
Unknown even to most naval aviators 
is a larger and equally dramatic story: 
the Navy’s struggle to bring its aviation 
accident rate under control� The number 
of aircraft and aircrews lost to accidents 
over the course of naval aviation’s history 
is staggering—in the tens of thousands, 
far more than ever were lost to combat�
A critical segment of that history 
occurred during the period that retired 
vice admiral Dunn reviews in his book� 
After World War II, tectonic changes 
occurred in naval aviation, including 
the introduction of jet aircraft and 
the advent of nuclear weapons� The 
pressure on the Navy to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of its aircraft carriers in 
the rapidly evolving environment of the 
1950s and ’60s was intense� The need to 
fight in Korea with new and inadequate-
ly understood aircraft technology, as well 
as to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent 
posture day or night, in almost any 
weather, produced horrendous accident 
rates� In 1954 alone the Navy and Ma-
rine Corps lost 776 aircraft to accidents, 
and 536 aircrewmen and passengers 
were killed� There was legitimate doubt 
that naval aviation would survive if that 
rate of mishaps could not be reduced�
But survive it did, through reducing 
accident rates—step by painful step� It 
is a complex, multifaceted story that 
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Dunn, a former commander of the 
Naval Safety Center and Deputy Chief 
of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, 
is uniquely qualified to tell� This is 
a book most easily understood and 
appreciated by those who have been a 
part of naval aviation� However, while 
the book’s second half gets rather 
technical, the author does provide both 
explanatory endnotes and appendices 
that offer background information to 
help the lay reader make sense of it�
Dunn appears to be on a mission to 
glorify those who made key contribu-
tions to the reduction in mishaps� This 
is entirely justified, as the efforts of such 
luminaries as James Flatley, Dr� Ashton 
Graybiel, and Bob Osborne helped to 
bring the accident rate down from the 
hundreds of planes and crewmen lost 
each year in the 1950s to the occasional 
mishap that naval aviation experiences 
now� Their efforts, and those of many 
others, not only saved thousands of 
lives and aircraft but ensured that 
the nation would be able to maintain 
command of the seas� The book is a 
mixture of narrative and analysis that 
forms a coherent explanation of how 
naval aviation shifted from being a 
freewheeling, daredevil operation to a 
disciplined and professional enterprise�
The book is well organized and the 
author’s writing is straightforward 
and clear� However, the book contains 
some small issues that casual readers 
likely would miss but that can nag at an 
experienced naval aviator (such as this 
reviewer)� One is the presence of contra-
dictory statements about the potential 
utility of the canceled supercarrier USS 
United States; another is what appear to 
be typos� The latter subtly change the 
meaning of certain paragraphs, such 
as the statement on page 22 that the 
helicopter community’s mishap experi-
ence was “atypical” for the day, when the 
word should have been “typical,” or the 
incorrect statement that the Frenchman 
Paul Bert’s hypoxia experiments took 
place in the twentieth century versus 
the nineteenth� There are enough of 
these “nits” in the first few chapters 
to distract the knowledgeable reader, 
although later chapters are cleaner�
The real issue is the book’s laudatory 
tone� Dunn is forthright in describing 
the various issues that led to the Navy’s 
awful accident rates, and correctly iden-
tifies the measures that eventually fixed 
the problem� Still, he fails to address 
what is, in this reviewer’s opinion, a key 
issue: the rate at which the Navy reduced 
its accident rate in comparison with the 
Air Force� In 1950, the Navy’s accident 
rate was one and one-half times that 
of the Air Force; by 1960 and through 
1970, it was four times higher than that 
of the Air Force, despite a concurrent 
reduction in the overall accident rate 
for both services� Even in 1980, the 
Navy rate remained three times that 
of the Air Force� However, by 1990 
the relative accident rates for the Navy 
and Air Force were equal—and have 
remained so ever since� Any analysis of 
naval aviation safety improvement in 
the period the book covers should take 
on this matter, and the failure to do so 
is a key drawback of the book� Had the 
Navy adopted the Air Force’s methods 
in the 1950s, thousands of additional 
lives and aircraft might have been saved� 
Why the service did not do so is an 
important part of the story, one that 
should be told� Dunn does a good job of 
describing the various threads that led to 
the Navy’s victory over mishaps and the 
book is worthwhile reading for anyone 
who has ever been involved in naval 
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aviation, but in the end it falls short of 
delivering more-thorough reporting�
ROBERT C� RUBEL
Navy Football: Return to Glory, by T� C� Cameron� 
Charleston, SC: History Press, 2017� 189 pages� 
$21�99�
As both a U�S� Military Academy 
(USMA) graduate and the father of 
a USMA graduate, I jumped at the 
chance to read a book about the 
success of the U�S� Naval Academy 
(USNA) football team� Let’s face it: 
Navy has a winning program that has 
dominated Army football in recent 
years, even though both teams draw 
from the same pool of talented high 
school athletes� T� C� Cameron traces 
the history of USNA’s football team, 
including its comeback, or “return to 
glory,” over the past fifteen years�
Bill Belichick, the legendary coach of 
the New England Patriots, wrote the 
foreword, in which he pays tribute to 
the Navy coaches and midshipmen 
who taught him the game of football� 
“When I think of Navy football, my 
early role models were some of the 
biggest legends in the program’s history” 
(p� 7)� Belichick grew up in Annapolis 
and his father, Steve Belichick, was an 
assistant football coach at the Naval 
Academy for thirty-four years�
Cameron first traces the history of Navy 
football� He describes the period from 
1950 to 1963 as its “Camelot” years� 
The Navy football team was successful 
under Coach Eddie Erdelatz and his 
assistant coach Wayne Hardin, who 
later succeeded him� During these years, 
Navy also built the Navy–Marine 
Corps Memorial Stadium� The Navy 
football team was winning consistently, 
and legends such as Tom Lynch and 
Heisman Trophy winners Joe Bellino 
and Roger Staubach were winning 
the hearts and minds of football fans 
across the country� Even President John 
F� Kennedy, himself a Navy veteran,
supported the Navy team� Kennedy’s
assassination in November 1963 was a
tremendous blow to the team, and many
wondered whether the Army-Navy
game would even be played the week
afterward� Ranked number two in the
country, Navy won the game, then went
on to lose to top-ranked Texas in the
Cotton Bowl� After the following season,
as Cameron puts it, “Camelot was over�
Without knowing it, a long cold winter
descended on the Navy program� It
would last almost forty years” (p� 26)�
Cameron characterizes the years 
between 1995 and 2001 as the “Big 
Tease�” Under Coach Charlie Weather-
bie, Navy football initially did well, 
experiencing winning seasons� However, 
as Cameron writes, “[h]is finish was a 
disaster, as Navy lost seventeen of the 
last eighteen” games he coached, “and 
twenty of twenty-one overall” (p� 51)� 
Navy football’s true renewed success 
began when Coach Paul Johnson, the 
offensive coordinator in 1995–96, 
returned, and Cameron portrays 
2002–2007 under the heading “Johnson 
Returns�” Johnson’s record at Navy was 
43-27, with five bowl appearances in six
seasons� More importantly, Johnson’s
teams crushed both Army and Air
Force, losing only once against another
service academy� The football team
has continued to have winning seasons
under Coach Ken Niumatalolo from
2008 to the present, a period Cameron
characterizes as a “Ball of Fire” because
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